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Crime, bandits, and community: how public panic shaped the social control of territory in
the Ottoman Empire
This study explores  the role  of crime,  bandits,  and public  panic in in the nineteenth  century
Ottoman  society  by  using  archival  documents  and  employing  a  comparative  perspective.  In
addition to the social bandit concept of Eric Hobsbawm, there is an introduction of two new
banditry  forms  in  this  study—opportunist  bandits  and  imagined  bandits.  The  comparison  of
different bandits clarifies that social bandits and opportunist bandits aggravated public panic and
produced imagined bandits. Hence, public panic and the dissent of local people unveiled through
rumors about the imagined bandits. The exploration of different forms of bandits in the Ottoman
Empire  is  a  response  to  the  vexed  issue  concerning  the  challenges  in  the  social  control  of
territories in a multiethnic and multi-religious empire. This study provides new conceptual tools
to rethink about the spatial dimensions in the emergence of bandits. This article shows that spatial
factors in the social control of territory can be influenced by the reaction of local people from
bottom-to-top and, in doing so, the spatial factors can determine the response of state authority.
The present  study,  therefore,  unveils  the power relationship  in  the social  control  of  territory
whether it is manifested by physical force or public panic.
INTRODUCTION
Bandits have played critical roles throughout history in affecting social geographies in terms of
the structure of social life, political order, and cultural change (Koliopoulos 1987; Cassia 1993;
Gallant  1999).  This  article  brings  the  role  of  bandits  to  the  fore  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  to
demonstrate how the social dynamics of everyday life and the political agendas of various groups
were under the serious influence of public violence and public panic among the multi-ethnic and
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multi-religious communities of the Ottoman society. Therefore, this study attempts to resolve the
vexed question of the complex relationship between bandits, local communities, and the empire
through identifying the critical importance of spatial factors. In exploring the role of bandits in
the contention-ridden Ottoman towns and villages, I clarify why bandits emerged and impacted
society in various ways. For this aim, I analyze how they became formidable authorities on the
imperial  periphery;  how the  central  state  authority  responded to the challenges  posed by the
bandits and the dissent of local communities; and what the spatial processes that determined the
form of bandit activity were. 
Crime in rural life can change and determine the dynamics between the state and society.
Like other imperial rules challenged by social and political tumults, the Ottoman Empire was also
severely impacted by organized crime and violence in the nineteenth century. Socioeconomic
difficulties  in  the  center  and  administrative  misrule  in  the  periphery  were  notorious  in
transforming the social and political landscapes of the rural life in the Ottoman Empire in the
nineteenth century. The increase in the number of bandits in this era created great concerns in
addition to the sociopolitical dissent that the Sublime Porte1— hereafter Porte—had to overcome.
Due to the ferocious attacks of bandits, public safety was one of the main concerns of the rural
communities. However, the bandits did not only imply social unrest and public unsafety. The
political conflicts, ethnic and religious motives in the age of nationalism created trouble for the
Ottoman officialdom. The uprisings against the Ottoman authority were eventually violent and
subversive, which created numerous victims. The Ottoman Empire suppressed the resistance and
hindered the prevalence of bandits through implementing non-violent reforms on one hand and
taking violent measures on the other. The fierce plans of the Porte aimed to reconsolidate its




I pose three main arguments in this article. First, engaging with some arguments of the
social bandit theory, I argue that the bandits have different forms according to (i) their source of
emergence, (ii) principal actors, (iii) principal goals, (iv) targets, and (v) spatial factors. The one-
dimensional perspective about bandits results in overlooking the micro dynamics of each violent
attack or suppression. This also limits our ability to contextualize the challenges in social and
political life, and the different priorities of the rural community and the state. Second, in addition
to social bandits, I introduce two other main bandit forms, which are  opportunist bandits and
imagined bandits.  The  social  bandits  are  the  outcomes  of  deep  social,  political  and cultural
dissent that form the identities of bandits and incite them to violently realize their goals. Different
from the social bandits, the opportunist bandits do not have any concerns about social injustice,
ethnic, or religious identity of their victims. The satisfaction of basic needs through extortion or
raids  was  a  common  feature  for  the  opportunist  bandits  to  dominate  the  communities  as  a
formidable local authority. The opportunist bandits emerged from a fragile political and social
context  and benefited  from the  circumstances  to  attain  maximum benefit  through the use  of
violence.  In this regard, the social bandits principally undermined the political and social order
of the Ottoman authority and diminished its power as a legitimate and just authority. Conversely,
the opportunist bandits principally undermined public safety through theft, raids, and engaging in
ordinary criminal activities in rural areas. The impotence of the state in the face of great dissents
and the prevalence of both social bandits and opportunist bandits created public panic among the
civilian members of community who provoked the creation of claims, rumors, and unverified
allegations  concerning  the  approaching  banditry  threat.  These  unconfirmed  assertions
exacerbated  public  panic  and  increased  social  pressure  in  the  networks  of  rural  habitus.
Therefore, the communities under severe risk of public panic generated  imagined bandits as if
there were a real banditry threat. The spatial conditions of dissent, the spatial opportunities of
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public unsafety, and the spatial imaginations of public panic determined the factors that created
the social bandits, opportunist bandits, and imagined bandits respectively.
I  used  archival  documents  that  I  derived  from  the  Ottoman  Archives  located  in
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri,2 Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive, in Istanbul. I also consulted
the Fonds of Dahiliye Nezareti (Ministry of Interior Affairs), Meclis-i Vala, (The Legislative and
Supreme  Council),  Hatt-i  Hümâyun (The  Imperial  Rescript  Collection),  Hariciye  Nezareti
(Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs),  and  Sadaret  Mektubi  Kalemi  Belgeleri (Documents  of  Grand
Vizier’s Offıce). All archival documents are cited in the endnotes. The documents in this study
cover the Tanzimat period broadly and analyze this era starting from the 1830s. My geographical
scope is limited to the Balkans that contained different ethnic and religious communities in the
rural  areas  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  including  dozens  of  different  ethnicities  in  addition  to
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities.
First, I briefly introduce the conditions in the social control of territories in the Ottoman
Empire  during the  Tanzimat  era.  Second,  I  present  the  theoretical  discussion concerning the
bandits, the priorities of community and state within a spatial context. The following two sections
introduce the activities of (i) social bandits, as well as the (ii) opportunist and imagined bandits,
respectively. I conclude my remarks regarding the role of history to grasp perplexing dynamics of
contentious societies and the direction of future research in the social control of territories.
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TERRITORY
The changing dynamics of relationships and multifaceted social networks shaped the Ottoman
space in terms of material and political contestation. In line with this argument, Yaycioglu (2016:
12) points out that “the relationship between the empire and the provinces is not a binary story
about  center  and  periphery.  The  Ottoman  Empire  appears  as  a  relatively  integrated  unit,
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entangled  through  ties,  institutions,  and  relationships  that  were  continuously  renegotiated  by
many actors.” The process in the spatializing politics within the state-territory context is not a
one-way street nor does it follow a route shaped from top to bottom (Agnew 2016).  In fact, the
relationship between bandits, community, and the state shows that the conflicting actors in the
center and the periphery shaped the form of this relationship together. The centrality of power in
the social control of territory is also related to the assumptions concerning the Ottoman space.
Brummett (2015: 8) portrays the Ottoman space under Sultan’s domains as a “complex form of
possession and identity, dependent not entirely what on what was actually, but also on what was
imagined, remembered, depicted, hoped for, and then visualized in textual and pictorial sources
such as maps and travel accounts.” This was another way in which the social control of territory
demonstrated the power of the empire. Hence, “a well-run war suggested a well-run empire; and
geography  was  a  factor  that  had  an  impact  on  both  war  and  imperial  administration”
(Anastasopoulos  2013: 125).  However,  the rise  of nationalism in the nineteenth  century also
changed the approach of Ottoman Empire towards the social control of territory and produced
more severe and frequent responses to control the territory that formed “the spatial attachments of
the inhabitants of state” (Kadercan 2017: 368). 
The  socio-economic  and  administrative  reform  attempts  of  the  Ottoman  governance
transformed this route into a symbolic arena in which the weak and strong parts of the Ottoman
Empire conflated through intensive policy changes within a time span of three centuries. The
extensive reforms during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) brought important changes
into the administrative, fiscal, and military areas (Levy 1971; Shaw 1975; Findley 1980). Indeed,
this prudent and challenging era was the harbinger of a more organized and centralized reform
period. The declaration of a binding document addressing the concerns of various communities in
the Ottoman Empire, even including the Sultan himself, was inevitable in the first half of the
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nineteenth century. Several remarkable reform packages including the Imperial Rescript of 18563
followed the declaration of the Edict of Gülhane in 1839, and this trend finally reached its peak in
1876 with the announcement of the first Ottoman constitution. Some of the fundamental values of
equality and justice through embracing the rule of law marked all these struggles to keep the
Empire  united  and  to  prevent  sociopolitical  decadence.  This  transformation  in  the  social,
political,  administrative, legal, and intellectual sphere, as a result, ushered a new phase in the
nineteenth century. This phase was eventually called Tanzimat, in other words, reorganization.
Aksan (2013: 414) mentioned that “the first decade of the Tanzimat reform unfolded as a
contest  between  the  traditional  rural  land-holders  and  the  new  centralising  bureaucracy.”
Moreover, these reforms led to dissent among local elites and peasants (Aksan 2013: 429). The
Tanzimat period was a crucial era to uncover the spatial dynamics of territory and the rule of
Ottoman Empire. In this context, Kadercan (2017) points out that “the centuries-old territorial
design  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  eventually  clashed  with  the  new  order  that  the  Ottoman
modernizing elites tried to impose upon the space–politics–society nexus especially in the second
half  of  the  nineteenth  century”  (Kadercan 2017:  162).  The Tanzimat  reforms included some
flexible and pragmatic approaches based on the balance between the needs of people and the
strategy of the Ottoman Empire. Kadercan (2017: 158) contextualizes this policy balance as a
grand strategy for expansion in the space-society-politics nexus.  The Porte was aware that the
corrupt rulers were rampant in the periphery that also increased social dissent in the rural areas.
Therefore, the Porte changed the local rulers of towns in many uprisings in which the bandits
played certain roles. The endeavors of the Porte to change the place of notorious governors aimed
to convey the message to the local public that the Porte recognized the concerns of dissident
people and put some efforts to restore the rule of law. Nevertheless, the cases presented below
show that  this  ostensible  attempt  of  the  Porte  was a  very dysfunctional  method because the
6
Sensitivity: Internal
fundamental  reason  of  uprisings  and  public  concerns  remained  mostly  unresolved  and
unrevealed. This chaotic social atmosphere provided the necessary conditions for the opportunist
bandits who extorted, robbed, and attacked the innocent people for a material need. Finally, the
increasing  violence  in  the  remote  towns  and villages  inspired  the  people  to  create  imagined
bandits as both a reaction to crime and violence and a demand for state intervention to restore
social order.
The social control of territory is a central issue for the sovereignty of state. The lack of
capacity in the social control of space also signifies the lack of power of state institutions that
may eventually break trust between the people and the state authority. In this regard, Horowitz
(2004) goes one step further and argues that “space is crucial to the definition of a state, and once
boundaries are demarcated, it is extraordinarily difficult to alter them. Boundaries are inscribed
both on paper  and on the ground with boundary markers” (477).  The bandits,  therefore,  are
unyielding actors posing risks against the boundaries of state and the existence of it. 
THE FORMS OF BANDITS:  PUBLIC TROUBLE AND PUBLIC PANIC WITHIN A
SPATIAL CONTEXT
The “preconditions underlying the authority and unity of the state since its inception has been that
the supreme authority within each independent regnum should be recognized as having no rivals
within its own territories.” (Neocleous 2003: 411). The territorial sovereignty of the state is a
principal factor when rethinking it within a spatial context of relational networks (Painter 2010).
What if the sovereignty of the state is defied by outlaws, rebels, bandits, or insurgents? Lilyblad
(2014) states  that  in  such a  situation,  illicit  authorities  emerge  in  the  territories  because  the
limited statehood is operative with the lack of a prevalent authority providing fundamental and
necessary security needs (Lilyblad 2014). The vacuum in the social control of territory is filled by
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other non-state authorities who do not only control territory, at least for a certain period, but also
create authority without establishing institutions through using violence, threat, and intimidation.
Bandits are the examples of such authoritarian figures, whether they are embraced by the local
community or despised by them. When the issue is bandits, “the power and influence of myth and
image far exceed that of social reality” (Slatta 1987: 8). This is the reason that our case study
offers  three  different  banditry  forms  based on different  motives. Exploring  bandits  within  a
criminal context reveals both the influence of local people in shaping the decision of state to
respond against banditry and the spatial dynamics of territory where the bandits flourish.
Barkey (2008:10)  highlighted  that  “imperial  state–periphery  relationships  are  not  direct
relationships between state and individual subjects; rather,  intermediate bodies, networks, and
elites  mediate  the  relationships.”  In  the  mediation  process  of  these  relationships,  the  social
control  of  territory  depends  not  only  the  agencies  themselves,  but  also  the  particularities  of
territory  itself.  Similarly,  Anastasopoulos  (2013:  125)  paid  attention  to  the  role  of  spatial
dynamics in the Ottoman Empire over the state and communities in the times of war; he stated:
Geography was not merely a natural agent, but had an important secondary political
dimension:  the distant  (in  psychological,  but  for  many provinces  also in  physical
terms) center of power, which during the war formally had moved from the capital to
the imperial camp near or beyond the frontiers, issued decrees through which it made
demands, often urgent ones, in trying to address needs that arose from the progress of
war.
Social bandits revolted against the state because of social, political, and cultural concerns.
Yet,  different  from the  social  bandits,  the  opportunist  bandits  abused  the  fragile  social  and
political context and attacked innocent people to extort them mainly for their survival. Therefore,
violence employed both by the social and opportunist bandits and the suppression of the Ottoman
8
Sensitivity: Internal
Empire created public panic. As a result, the imagined bandits were the manifestation of this
public panic, which were expressed in the minds of local community as if they were real bandits.
From this point of view, the imagined bandits were idiosyncratic structures of social life that
emerged with the surge of public panic and the spread of rumors, claims, and allegations. The
important point is that the cases and the forms of bandits represented in this study provide a basis
to  question  the  arguments  raised  through  the  well-known  social  banditry  theory  of  Eric
Hobsbawm. He stated:
The point about social bandits is that they are peasant outlaws whom the lord
and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are
considered  by  their  people  as  heroes,  as  champions,  avengers,  fighters  for
justice,  perhaps  even  leaders  of  liberation,  and  in  any  case  as  men  to  be
admired, helped and supported. This relation between the ordinary peasant and
the  rebel,  outlaw  and  robber  is  what  makes  social  banditry  interesting  and
significant ... Social banditry of this kind is one of the most universal social
phenomena known to history (Hobsbawm 1969: 20).
Limiting the bandits within a polarized socioeconomic context may remain an enigma to
understand the deep and complex relationships among the actors of polity and social life. As
Hobsbawm argued, the sympathy for the bandits by the peasants, reveals only a small part of the
entire story. This is the reason that we need to go beyond this narrative to portray banditry issue
meticulously. The whole story coincides with several fluid and transforming determinants that
shaped different forms of bandits, various reactions of communities, and the priorities of state. 
The many cases explored in this article show that the perplexity of social and political
conditions, the changing and sometimes-conflicting relationships among the three agencies—the
bandits,  the community  and the state—pose  serious  questions  about  the universal  validity  of
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social bandit theory. Even though I will provide social banditry examples in this study which are
different from Hobsbawm, I argue that it is challenging to evaluate bandits separately from their
environmental contexts which include political and cultural concerns as well. This is the reason
that I redefine the social bandit by broadening its scope with the inclusion of the political and
cultural concerns of those militant rebels in addition to social concerns. 
The following cases illuminate the social, political and cultural concerns conflated in the
emergence of social bandits. The violent and bloody attacks of social bandits and opportunist
bandits  shaped the perceptions of power among the fragile  communities at  the helm of state
impotence.  The public  unsafety  was under  the  pressure of  public  uncertainty  because  of  the
heterogeneous character of the various bandit groups. The sometimes-conflicting perceptions in
the entire  society made the public  dissent more visible at  the collective level.  Therefore,  the
imagined bandits  gained a strong foothold among the community members of periphery and
remote areas through rumors and public unsafety. The imagined bandit was not able to target
anyone as an illusory figure of public panic. Nevertheless, the message conveyed through the
creation of imagined bandits by the local community was clear as it signified the weakness of
state authority and the fragility of public safety. These two determinants also distinguished the
character  of imagined bandits  in the theoretical  framework of bandit  forms that I  develop in
thisstudy. 
I utilize a micro-sociological approach to find answers for macro-sociological questions
related  to  the  social  control  of  territory.  For  this  reason,  five  factors  determine  my
methodological classification: (i) the source of emergence of a bandit group, (ii) principal actors/
perpetuators, (iii) principal goals, (iv) the targeted subjects, and (v) spatial factors (Table 1 here). 
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SOCIAL BANDITS: GREAT CONCERNS IN THE EVERYDAY LIFE
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Corrupt practices manifested themselves in different guises in many public spheres so much so
that  saving a  bandit  member  was  an  issue  of  bribe  and secret  allegations  between the  state
officials  and relatives  of  the bandits.  For example,  the father  of  Kostandi  offered a bribe to
Lieutenant Selim Ağa with the help of Anagonos in order to release his son from prison who was
jailed for banditry activities. However, when this news reached the Porte, Lieutenant Selim Ağa,
the father of Kostandi and Anagonos were interrogated because of the related corruption case.4
An iniquitous taxation system was one of the most powerful symbols of socioeconomic
vulnerabilities  for  the  tax-paying subjects  who were mostly the  peasants  and obliged to  pay
precise tax charges on time. The contentious tax resistance movement in the periphery was one of
the leading and common reasons that enforced the Porte to rearrange the amount of tax and its
payment time. The deference of tax payment was tolerated from time to time when the  reaya5
was not able to pay it. The reaya became the victims of corruption at the hands of rapacious local
rulers,  mütesellim, and later  mutasarrıf, who collected tax according to the legal contracts that
they signed with the Porte (Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba 1987: 90). This is one of the main
reasons that the collection of tax and its organization were germane and central to understand the
roots of resistance and the reaction of state. 
One of the first and most remarkable tax uprising episodes in the Tanzimat era occurred in
Niš in 1841. Thousands of peasants left their homes and migrated to the Principality of Serbia
because of  their  tax  concerns.  Leaving homelands  behind was shattering,  which  transformed
dissent into violent action aimed at the local authority of the Ottoman rule. Most importantly,
their  solicitous  movement  conveyed  a  symbolic  and yet  an  alarming  message  for  the  Porte.
Specifically,  these  social  upheavals  could  have  been  enduring  in  contrary  to  the  hopes  and
expectations fostered by the declaration of the Edict of  Gülhane in 1839 that aimed to create a
more integrated and egalitarian society. In fact, the social dissents in Niš were discernible before
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the revolt. The first signal of the social unrest echoed in the streets of town just a few months
before migrating to the Principality of Serbia. The grievous tax concerns of the peasants gave the
uprising the required mobilization from the bottom. Besides, some of the reactionary notables of
the town, whose powerful social status was seriously at risk with the codes imposed by the Edict,
gave an impetus to the former (Uzun 2002: 37). More than two thousand people gathered in a
church located in the suburb of Niš and asked for the tax registers from the local governments to
examine whether the tax ratios were split up accurately (Uzun 2002: 37-38). Even though they
received the tax registers,  which remained with them for two days, they were not ultimately
convinced that the tax was calculated correctly according to the codes of the Edict (Uzun 2002:
47). Their claim was clear and straightforward: Any claim for extra tax collection was a violation
of the Edict. The bandits and the peasants, who were overwhelmingly Orthodox Christians, acted
together in their fights against the local Ottoman authorities to resolve their tax problems and
erode the  malpractice  of  the  local  elites,  who were  perceived  by the  rebels  as  the  principal
creators of grievous social problems. 
The  reaya demanded the removal of the notorious state officials from the government.
This included the aggressive Sabri Pasha, and afterwards the Albanian origin tax collectors. The
other  demands  were  related  to  the  compensation  of  damages  because  the  Albanian  irregular
soldiers fired the houses of reaya and seized their goods. They also asked for the prevention of
the brigandage activities related to theft and violence in the region. The Porte accepted most of
the requests asserted by the subjects in order to convince the migrated peasants to turn back with
their  animals  from the  Principality  of  Serbia  to  their homes.  All  these  demands  would  be
tolerated and were perceived as reasonable wishes by the Porte, so they were accepted with a
nonchalant stature. Nevertheless, the Porte immediately rejected one of the crucial requests of the
subjects. This was about the organization of tax collection. The subjects asked for the right of
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selection of the tax collectors among the people from their own communities. This had already
broken the trust between the resisting local community and the central state authority—the Porte
—and brought dubious approaches and verdicts  in such requests.  Shortly after the agreement
between the Porte and the reaya, the subjects and more than 50,000 animals moved their homes
to the villages and towns of the Niš province in 1841 (Uzun 2002: 77-78). The conflicts had not
been  resolved  completely  as  the  attacks  of  bandits  led  to  more  insurgents  in  the  following
decades. However, the ingravescent social problems were postponed at least for a while.
The lower group in the socio-economic stratification of Ottoman society, mostly the tax-
paying peasants, was the most vulnerable group as it happened in the case of Niš, Çarşanba and
Vidin;  however,  they  were  not  the  only  victims  of  the  taxation  system.  Although  it  rarely
occurred, the nobles were also enforced to respond to the needs of the Porte even during the
difficult times when they could not afford to respond to these requests. Zeynelabidin, a religious
notable, was victimized when the pirates seized his 60,000 kilos of wheat and the local bandits
looted three farms that he owned. Even under these severe conditions, he managed to send one
hundred equipped irregular light cavalries with their leaders to fight for the Ottoman Empire, but
there were limits to his capabilities. He could not fulfil another request when the Ottoman local
officials  asked him to dispatch 268,000 kilos  of wheat  again.  There was nothing left  except
preparing a petition to be sent directly to the Porte about his incapability to fulfill these requests.
He explicitly mentioned in the petition that he was ruined not only because of the attacks of
bandits but also by the cumbersome tax requests that also significantly diminished his economic
power. According to Zeynelabidin, this was the time for the resonation of the Sultan’s mercy that
should have been geared towards his incapacity.6 The frugality in the resources was the norm in
the lives of most subjects, if not all. Conversely, there were limits of obedience towards authority
while the types of obedience could be different from each other. The acts of writing petitions to
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the  Porte  and pleading  for  forgiveness  of  the  Sultan,  as  Zeynelabidin  did,  characterized  the
socioeconomic  fragility  between  the  Sultan  and  his  economically  powerful  subjects  in  the
attribution of those social dissents. The reaction of the nobles also implied the decreasing power
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  was defied  twice.  First,  the  attacks  of  the  bandits  brought  a
significant social and economic burden. Second, the Porte had to deal with the dismay of the
peasants and even the notables who were not reluctant to express their loss and desperation in the
face of state incapacity.
The provinces were exposed to the violence of social bandits shortly after the declaration
of the Edict of Gülhane. However, the attacks of insurgents were not the only cause of social
unrest. The local Ottoman  officials played a greater role in imperiling the social unrest because
of the corrupt bureaucrats and implementations in the periphery. Nevertheless, the central offices
of the Porte did not entirely ignore the complaining letters and petitions about the misconduct of
local bureaucrats. One of these letters reached Istanbul in 1856 and the Porte promptly sent an
urgent notification to the  İslimye7 province ordering the elimination of the unjust policies and
unacceptable behaviors of the local authorities towards subjects immediately.8 The Porte strictly
abolished the violation of the rule of law and demonstrated harsh reactions from time to time
against its officials by punishing them. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire faced large challenges
when punishing bureaucrats; by changing their posts they could not eliminate the great dissents in
the periphery. Indeed, enforcing the state representative in the periphery to embrace the ethical
codes  of  lawfulness  was more  puzzling  than  revising  and making the  necessary  laws in  the
central offices of the Porte in Istanbul. The administrative malpractice took its focal position as
an applied philosophy, and the local people did not remain silent to show their reactions. This
time Karlovo, a town in central Bulgaria, was in the center of the accusing claims, which targeted
the deputy governor of the town because he refused to clean out the streets from the victims’
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corpses who lost their lives during the attacks of social bandits. It was argued that the governor
asked for extra-charges from the reaya to do his job.9 
The penetration of the social bandits into local law enforcement agencies was one of the
remarkable examples demonstrating the relationship between the dissent in periphery and the
impotence of the central state authority. The subjects and some of the local bureaucrats reported
such  illegal  collaborations  to  the  Porte.  However,  the  Porte  was  suspicious  of  cooperation
between the state forces and bandits. This was the reason that the central government generally
opened an inquiry before taking its final decision regarding the claims about the infiltration of
bandits into the state’s military and police forces. For instance, a letter issued on November 11,
1850 asked for more information for the investigation of a zaptieh, police force, that was accused
of being the head of a social bandit group at the same time.10 In order to stymie such scandals, the
Porte warned the local governors to hire zaptiehs from “honorable” and “trustworthy” people.11
The concerns of the officials in respect to the activities of social bandits were critically alarming.
These claims would have put the authority of the Ottoman Empire under severe risk. The Porte
sent the Interior Minister secretary Mümtaz Efendi to the provinces in the Balkan region in the
same year to report the social context in the conflicting areas.12 Those claims show that the very
fabric  of  dissent  in  the  rural  community  life  spurred  and  mobilized  social  bandits  from the
bottom. The character of mobilization demonstrates that the reaction of social bandits could find
alternative methods to corrode the state from inside through transforming the leader of social
bandits into a zaptieh. 
The  story  of  the  religious  noble  Zeynelabidin  narrated  above  was  a  form of  passive
obedience towards the mightier authority of the state when he accepted the requests of the Porte,
whereas he also complained about his challenging situation and even implicitly referred to the
ineffectiveness  of  the  state  in  guaranteeing  public  safety.  His  passive  obedience,  which  was
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conflated  with  reaction  and  local  concerns,  tersely  explicated  the  contentious  relationship
between the absolute authority and the reactionary elites. In contrast, the active resistance drew a
different portrait of power balance, as much of the community in a town or village did not belong
to a socioeconomically distinguished group, but a lower social  class that paid their  taxes and
revolted against  social  injustice.  Such a reactionary uprising reverberated  after  the attacks  of
social bandits against the appointed pashas and mütesellims. Debar, a sanjak center of the Scutari
province, became disreputable with one of these attacks; the  stifling atmosphere of the town
sustained extensively in the nineteenth century.  Mütesellims of this  town, as was the case in
many  other  towns  in  the  region,  were  notoriously  unwelcomed  figures  of  the  Ottoman
governance.  The tense socio-political  dynamic in  the periphery provided the rationalized  and
psychological aspirations to the social bandits of Debar when they targeted mütesellims, local
notables, and governors. Mecnun Talib Bey was an ideal candidate for their attacks, who had
recently been appointed as the new mütesellim of Debar. The bandits had taken him hostage in
May 1836.13 Mütesellim was not the only accused Ottoman official in such attacks. The similar
perceptions fostered vengeance and hatred toward one of the highest militaries and administrative
officers. The heated accusations materialized violently when the bandits of  Shkodra kidnapped
the governor Muhassil Hafiz Pasha.14 The spring of 1836 provoked the spark of public disorder
with the advancement of the Debar bandits from Ohrid to Monastir.15 The bandits of Shkodra and
Debar  alarmed  other  mütesellims  of  the  neighbor  towns.  Accordingly,  after  receiving  this
notification,  the  mütesellims  of  Mat  and  Tirana,  who  were  residing  in  Lezhë at  that  time,
anxiously  took  their  positions  to  deter  the  rebels  and  wait  for  the  asâkir-i  muntazama, the
reformed  regular  army  of  the  Sultan,  from  Salonika under  the  control  of  Iskender  Pasha.16
Employing troops to launch a fierce assault against the social bandits was one of the common
methods,  which  was  applied  by  the  Porte  extensively  to  re-establish  social  order  when  its
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authority was tested and even defied by the bandits. This expected measure was implemented
when dozens of troops were sent to Debar with the approval of Sultan Mahmud II. Conversely,
the resisting social bandits changed the reason for their uprising in the face of the approaching
formidable and decisive Ottoman army. The bandits’  verdict  demonstrated a rationalized and
obligatory change in their behaviors when considering the bandits’ impotence against one of the
most powerful regular army factions of the Ottoman Empire. This was clear in their declaration:
“We did not rebel to make a war; our resistance is based on religious purposes.”17 After this
implicit submission, the troops of Ismet Pasha and the governor Mahmud Hamdi Pasha sealed the
fate of Debar by sustaining the safety of town under the rule of Porte in a short period of time.18
Nevertheless,  the  social  bandits  did  not  vanish  in  the  region  in  that  year.  The command  of
Sultan’s  hatt-i  sharif was  proof of  this  concern.  The  hatt-i  sharif uttered  the urgent  need to
consign soldiers to Monastir, which was one of the most significant socio-political centers of the
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, to repress a recently erupted resistance. The social bandits of
Shkodra were destroyed severely in the autumn of 1835.19 After a few years of this suppression,
the social bandits of Debar and Shkodra induced their activities; however, many of them perished
due to the intensified military operations of the Porte in the winter of 1839.20 
The risks to the territorial integrity of the state posed by these attacks produced potential
scenarios that could be seen only during the great wars with enormous social and political effects.
The letter sent from the periphery to the center demystifies this fact by stating that if the bandits
of Shikora were brought under control, the persistence of social order in all of Albania could have
been  attained  and  the  submission  of  subjects  to  the  Sultan’s  decrees  could  have  been
guaranteed.21 Regardless,  the  Porte  mostly  limited  the  scope  of  counter  policies  against  the
bandits by imposing mostly military measures. The Porte did not attempt the implementation of
radical land reforms to ameliorate the great concerns of peasants in the villages. When steps were
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taken to resolve the concerns of local misrule, the common solution was to appoint the governor
to  a  punishment  post.  Thus,  the  violent  and  repressive  response  of  the  Empire  against  the
rebellious attempts was followed by a demand to reappoint a new mütesellim to the towns, as
occurred in the case of the Debar resistance.22 
The  social  bandit  examples  presented  above aimed  to  undermine  the  ruling  authority
because of the dissents that shaped the identity of resisting bandits through deep social problems
of the region including corruption, social injustice, public issues, and tax governance. For this
reason, they resisted and attacked the state officials and local nobles. Furthermore, these social
bandit groups gained a more formidable character with the ethnic and religious sentiments, which
intensified the level and number of uprisings particularly after the second half of the nineteenth
century  until  the  fall  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Bulgarians,  Serbs,  Montenegrins,  Greeks,
Macedonians, Albanians, and Bosnians organized numerous attacks in the Balkans against the
Ottoman authority  with the help of  bandits  to  gain independence  from the Ottoman Empire.
Moreover,  the  opportunist  bandits  targeted  both  the  state  forces  and  civilians  without
distinguishing ethnic or religious identities of their victims. The opportunist bandits presented in
the next section show that their attacks increased the already-fragile public unsafety in the region
and fostered public panic that led to the creation of imagined bandits.
OPPORTUNIST AND IMAGINED BANDITS:  PUBLIC PANIC IN THE EVERYDAY
LIFE
Opportunist bandits do not consider ethnic or religious identity of their victims when they attack
them. For example, Sheikh Feyzulah Efendi from the Rufai Tarikat, which was a respected Sufi
sect  in  the  region  founded  by  Ahmed  Ar  Rifa’i,  was  in  despair  due  to  the  attacks  of  the
opportunist bandits. His house in Çatalca was looted and despoiled in 1852.23 The complaints of
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the important local elites sent the central government into a state of agitation. After the dramatic
case of Sheikh Feyzulah Efendi, the Porte sent a letter to the local officials of Çatalca. However,
the Porte was not able to constitute a sea change in the power dynamics of provinces to guarantee
public safety and prevent such attacks. The letter of the Porte only ordered to be more heedful in
such cases in the Sanjak of Tirhala.24 The activities of the opportunist bandits continued in the
Eastern Bulgaria through several incidents and attacks. For instance, violence and social upheaval
afflicted Razgrad25 and Sozopol.26 27 In 1856, the opportunist bandits raided a flat of a family in
Gabrova,  in  central  Bulgaria.28 Another  group  of  opportunist  bandit  extorted  the  goods  of
Hüseyin who was a customs official of Durrës29 port in 1856.30 In the 1850s, the Bulgarian-origin
opportunist bandits were notorious in the region.
The opportunist bandits were in urgent need of material sources to survive so looting and
robbing were the most employed practices. For example, a year after the Durrës incident, Revil, a
Jewish subject became the victim of opportunist bandits. His house in Toyran in Salonika was
robbed. The Porte immediately started an investigation to punish the members of this  bandit
group.31 The increasing number of investigations was the main indicator of the challenges that the
Porte attempted to overcome to maintain public safety in everyday life. The Porte recommended
more  caution  in  such  incidents.  Regardless,  in  many  cases,  the  Porte  could  not  convict  the
robbers; however,  there were some occasions in which the Porte was able to return the stolen
goods of victims. For example,  the students registered in religious institutions  to educate the
future religious class of the Empire became victims of the bandits, but many of these victims
were fortunate enough to have their goods returned. Abdullah Efendi and his friends were part of
this fortunate group when several bandits on their way to Şumnu attacked them.32 The Ottoman
government gave back the stolen goods and their money after chasing the opportunist  bandit
group and arresting them.33
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The Serbian opportunist bandits crossed into the Ottoman Empire from the Principality of
Serbia and targeted the Serbian peasants in the border villages and towns. Brichte Todosve from
Nova Varoš was one of these peasants.  First,  the bandits  beat him ferociously,  seized his 36
goats, and brought them to Serbia in 1874. Brichte was not the only victim; his neighbors, Baiik
and Ispeeyo, were also the targets of the bandits. Their eight horses and nine bulls ended up in the
hands of the same bandit group.34 These attacks created fundamental fragilities in social life, so
much so that a home of a peasant would be the target of an opportunist bandit in the dark silence
of dawn. For instance, the Serbian bandits raided the house of Vasilya from Macik village of
Nova Varoš in the very early morning. The bandit members beat him savagely and shot his wife
in front of him. They also seized a large portion of the goods, cattle, and money of the other
residents in the village. The Christian subjects tragically suffered from the attacks of their co-
religious  bandit  groups.  Around  300  opportunist  bandits  in Nova  Varoš entered  numerous
villages and engaged in an intense, small war with the military forces of the Ottoman governance.
Ottoman rulers opened the blocked roads and sustained public security in the region at a high
cost; however, the Porte could not eliminate the opportunist bandits permanently in the region. A
few Serbian bandits  lost  their  lives in the armed conflicts  that occurred between the Serbian
bandits and the Ottoman forces, whereas the others managed to flee.35 The next year, different
opportunist  bandits  attacked36 different  locations  in  Northern  Bulgaria,  particularly  in
Svishtov,37 Pleven,38 Lovech,39 and Sevlievo.40 
The opportunist bandits, who resided in the recently founded Greek State, crossed into the
Ottoman border for ransom, extortion, and homicide. Indeed, these activities became chronic and
normalized criminal occurrences starting from the 1850s within the Ottoman and Greek border.41
A non-Muslim subject, who was working in the chiflik of Erbeyli, was kidnapped and taken to
the rugged and remote mountains of Greece. He was robbed and left hopeless. Nothing remained
21
Sensitivity: Internal
except  to  seek  justice,  requesting  the  arrest  of  the  opportunist  bandits  upon  his  return  to
Avrethisar, the center of Kilkis, which is about 31 miles away from Salonika. The Porte opened
an immediate inquiry to identify the offenders and compensated the victimized man financially.42
The ransom was the leitmotiv  in kidnapping cases.  Nevertheless,  paying the ransom did not
always guarantee the freedom of victims. A year later from the robbery, a kidnapped person from
the  village  of  Cuma43 was  found dead  even though  the  ransom was  paid  to  the  opportunist
bandits.44 Locals were not only the victims of opportunist bandits, the Greek state also produced
assertions that bandit members, who committed crimes in Greece, were under the protection of
Ottoman officials. The security forces of the customs house in Greece asserted that Kaspasta,
who was the head of his own bandit, used the office of the Ottoman officials as a shelter. The
Porte first  opened an inquiry;  however,  after  this  verdict,  the Porte  perceived the claim as a
distorted truth so decided not to punish any officials.45
There are many ways to define the heterogeneous identity of the bandits. It is a sad truth
that one of these paths made them the victims of injustice, inequality, poverty and all forms of
violence deployed against them, as shown in the previous section through the examples of social
bandits. On the other hand, other accounts rendered different bandits the prominent figures of
aggression,  roughness,  intimidation,  and  sometimes  oppression.  The  incidents  and  crimes
committed against the innocent people particularly by the opportunist bandits leveraged public
panic, which also created the praised and cursed stories about the bandits at the same time. This
dilemma stimulated  the  combination  of  myth  and reality  about  them in  the  same story  who
became the complex and yet mostly unresolved figures of rural landscape. The perplexing social
status of the bandits resulted in the spread of rumors about them and deteriorated the already
fragile situation of the community life. 
The rumors and claims constituted treacherous conditions and challenged the realms of
22
Sensitivity: Internal
public safety and state authority. One of these examples occurred when rumors spread regarding
the arrival of the bandits of Sfakia from Crete to the islands of the southern Aegean Sea in 1858.46
A considerable amount of information was disseminated swiftly between different communities
and villages concerning the approaching threat of bandits. However, many of those claims were
in vain, erroneous, or not verified, as had happened in the case of the bandits from Sfakia. A few
months  after  this  incident,  the zaptiehs  of  Salonica were blamed for  being the former bandit
members. The Porte investigated the case and found the claim to be null and void.47 After three
years, similar rumors circulated in the neighbor settlements, indicating that the bandits shook
Skopje and the villages close to the town. However, again the Ottoman officials declared the
rumor to be untrue.48 These allegations were understandable, if not easily discernible at the first
glance, because producing reactions for self-defense against a serious threat is a collective and
rationalized behavior when the state authority is unable to eliminate that threat. 
Angelov et. al. (2013) put forth the notion that different geographical patterns are shaped
by material  and immaterial  factors.  For example,  he distinguished that  “material  geographies
(amenable  to  quantitative  and mathematical  methodologies),  imagined  or  mental  geographies
(that invite discursive and ideological analysis), and the harder to define category of ‘lived space’
that is the hybrid product of social, intellectual, and bodily experiences” (Angelov et. al. 2013:
12-13). The imagined bandits, in this context, reflected the outcry of local people who needed the
help of imperial power to guarantee the safety of living periphery. This outcry resonates both in
the material and imagined geographies. As Withers (2009: 650) mentioned space “is not simply a
location or local, but site of wider networks” in which the meaning of subaltern is contested. The




In the Ottoman Empire, “the authority relations flow from the central state to the local
elites and from them to the local populations” (Barkey 2008: 10). Yet this hierarchical flow of
authoritative relations does not signify the flow of power relations because the imagined bandits
show that local populations were not passive segments of authority-power nexus in the spatial
dynamic of social control. In this context, Tilly (1977) criticizes the Durkheimian approach of
social control. Different from Durkheim, Tilly perceives real contenders as active agencies who
strive for their interests and power. The creation of imagined bandit by the local population is a
process to strive for their interests and gain empowerment thereof. Tilly (1977: 2) comes to the
conclusion that “collective action brings benefits, in the form of collective goods.” The dissent
created by social and imagined bandits, as a result, contribute to the creation of collective action
by creating  imagined  bandits  in  the  conundrum of  public  panic.  Thus,  the  imagined  bandits
signify the challenge of living under unsafe conditions on the one hand and the need of attaining
public safety with the intervention of state authority on the other. The need for public safety by
local populations creates venues to attain protection as a form of collective goods. The in-group’s
formulation of an imagined place consists of its own ideals and values that target the eradication
of undesired elements from the territory (Egbert et al. 2016). The imagined bandits demonstrate
the need of an imagined territory in which social control of that territory is sustained by state
authority through cleansing unwanted bandit groups.
The increasing level  of  public  panic in  everyday life  due to the  attacks  of  the social
bandits and opportunist bandits led to the creation of imagined bandits. The spatial conditions of
dissent  played a role in the creation of social  bandits  and the spatial  opportunities  of public
unsafety consolidated the authority of opportunist bandits. The unconfirmed rumors and claims
prevailed and shaped the local public culture through which the imagined bandits spread fear and
fostered public panic in the villages and towns. Thus, the spatial imaginations of public panic
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brought imagined bandits to the fore as the key concept in reflecting both the hopelessness of
community and their collective fear.  The loss of social order in some areas or the weakness of
state authority in the social control of territories contributed to the process of the emergence of
imagined bandits. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire sent armies to the villages and towns
when  local  communities  drafted  letters  and  asked  for  the  direct  intervention  of  the  central
government in Istanbul. In doing so, the local community became active agencies by shaping the
social  control  of  territories.  Therefore,  the  local  community  structured  power  relations  from
bottom-to-top in the social control of territories and the imagined bandits were one of clearest
examples  of  this  horizontal  relationship.  Violence  of  the  bandits  against  the  civilians  and
innocents was the determining force behind the imagined bandits. Furthermore, the weakened
state power increased the significance of these threats and risks posed by the social bandits and
opportunist bandits. The state officials struggled to overcome the threat of bandits as they were
under the influence of local assertions and claims. All these struggles implied that they strove for
an imagined figure. Public unsafety, thus, became perilous and common in the everyday life and
played a stimulating role in the consolidation of imagined bandits.
CONCLUSION
Challenging the overgeneralization imposed by the social  banditry concept,  the present study
introduced two main banditry forms—opportunist bandits and the imagined bandits and evaluated
them through spatial factors. The social bandits brought great concerns of the communities into
the social, political, and cultural realms of rural life that shaped the identities of bandits as well.
The spatial conditions of dissent contributed to their empowerment as leading local figures. In
contrast,  the  opportunist  bandits  targeted  the  civilians  through  committing  heinous  crimes
without any concerns about the ethnic or religious identities of their victims. Different from the
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social  bandits, the survival needs and the struggle to consolidate their local authority through
notorious violent attacks are the main characteristics of the opportunist bandits. The attacks of the
opportunist bandits exacerbated violence and public panic while crystallizing the state’s inability
to  guarantee  public  safety  and  overcome  the  socio-political  tumult  in  rural  life.  The  spatial
opportunities  of  public  unsafety,  therefore,  were  the  main  determinants  in  the  emergence  of
opportunist bandits.  The tamed rural towns witnessed the seeds of violence sown by bandits,
rebels, and overreactions of the local Ottoman rulers to sustain reconciliation and compliance. 
Crime and public panic created particularly by the opportunist bandits, and the incapacity
and  over-reaction  of  state  authority,  resulted  in  many  rumors  in  the  local  community.  The
extensive and unverified claims about the bandits constituted a clear demand by the local and
civilian community. That demand conveyed the need of protection by the state or a mightier force
in the face of approaching pernicious risks. The imagined bandits, therefore, were the outcomes
of uncontrolled public panic due to the lack of fundamental public safety in the rural habitus. The
spatial imaginations of public panic played a greater role in the creation of imagined bandits.
After the Ottoman officials’ investigation, the Porte either denied or unconfirmed many of the
assertions about the approaching bandit danger. However, uncovering the rumors completely in
such cases was not an easy task because the local bureaucrats in the periphery did not always
apply the rules and obligations dictated by the Porte. This was the reason that social control of
territories did not follow solely a top-to-bottom route, but a bottom-to-top route also shaped the
conditions in the social control of territories as we learn from the example of imagined bandits.
The  allegations  between  oppressive  elites  and  solid  corruption  networks  among  the  local
Ottoman officials created dissent and disappointment among the central government officials of
the  Porte.  The dependence  of  the  Porte  on the  secret  information  leaked by the  notoriously
unfaithful bureaucrats in the periphery rendered the Porte’s authority more fragile. There was a
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widespread belief that many zaptiehs were also the members of bandit groups, as noted in the
cases. The gap between the local authority and the central control mechanism of the state over the
periphery created the required habitus to distort the truth by the local Ottoman officials as well.
All these factors made the social  control of territories both challenging and a vital  reason of
intervention of the state authority.
The need to extend the definition of social bandit is underscored in this study with the
inclusion  of  political  and cultural  concerns  to  explicate  the  bandits  in  the  context  of  spatial
factors. In addition, the two bandit forms, the opportunist and imagined bandits, derived from the
examination of various cases through considering the determining factors in the classification
process. Drawing major conclusions about the bandits is a detrimental attempt to conceive the
dynamic, multifaceted, and contentious social structure from which the bandits emerge. The three
bandit forms presented in this study explain an important portion of bewildering socio-political
panorama of rural life in the Ottoman Balkans during the Tanzimat era and challenges endured
regarding the social control of territories. In this context, future studies about the bandits and
social agencies may benefit from embracing a multi-layered method and using micro perspectives
in the detection of nuances and complex relationships of the spatial  factors that shape social,
political,  and  cultural  life.  In  doing  so,  we  may  develop  novel  concepts  to  illuminate  the
challenging conditions of public panic, the reaction of people, and the response of state authority.
ENDNOTES
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1 The Sublime Porte signifies Bâb-ı Âli, which literally means the high gate and used as a metonym for
the central Ottoman government in Istanbul.
2 BOA hereafter.
3 The Edict of 1856 in the era of Abdulmecid I was a progressive document based on the equality
principle to create Ottomanism as an umbrella and inclusive term so much so that  vatandaş, fellow-
citizen, was used first-time in the Edict while referring to the Ottoman subjects. The fundamental rights
of the non-Muslims were recognised and the Edict also enforced the conscription of non-Muslims into
the army. From this point of view, it minimised, at least in principle, the social and legal differences
among different religious communities to strengthen the cultural fabrics of Ottomanism. 
4 BAO. MVL. 911/32, 19 Receb 1274 – 5 March 1858.
5 Reaya traditionally means the tax-paying subjects, but in the nineteenth century there was a common
tendency  to  use  the  term  for  the  non-Muslim  subjects.  Tebaa,  the  entire  Ottoman  subjects, also
remained in practice in the era of Ottomanism that aimed to harmonise different communities within
the melting pot of Ottoman identity.
6 BOA. C.DH. 30/1460, 29 Z.Hicce 1255 – 4 March 1840. The system of petition widened the scope
justice and strengthened the relationship between the Sultan and his subjects. For more information
about the role of petition see Yuval Ben-Bassat,  Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late
Ottoman Palestine. (London: I.B Tauris), 182.
7 Sliven present name
8 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 238/99, 5 Şevval 1272 - 9 June 1856.
9 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 413/46, 19 Z.hicce 1276 – 8 July 1860.
10 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 38/95, 8 Muharrem 1267 – 13 November 1850.
11 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 296/68, 19 R.Ahir 1274 – 7 December 1857
12 BOA. HAT 408/21251 F, 13 Z.hicce 1254 – 27 February 1839.
13 BOA. HAT 405/21176 B, 25 Ramadan 1251- 14 January 1836 and HAT 405- 21176 A, 27 Ramadan
1251 – 16 January 1836.
14 BOA. HAT 414/2146, 29 Zilhicce 1251 – 16 April 1836.
15 Bitola present name.
16 BOA. HAT 408/21246 O, 19 R.Ahir 1251 – 14 August 1835.
17 BOA. HAT 408/21246 H, 17 R.ahir 1251 – 12 August 1835.
18 BOA. HAT 408/21246 A, 21 Receb 1251 – 12 November 1835 and HAT 408 21246 B, 21 R.Ahir
1251 – 16 August 1835.
19 BOA. HAT 422/21739 C, 25 C.ahir 1251 – 18 October 1835.
20 BOA. HAT 413/21454 B, 29 Z.hicce 1254 – 15 March 1839.
21 BOA. HAT 413/21455 N, 26 Safer 1251 – 23 June 1835.
22 BOA. HAT 408/21251 F, 13 Z.hicce 1254 – 27 February 1839.
23 BOA. A.MKT.MHM. 755-88. 2 Ramadan 1268-20 June 1852.
24 BOA. A.MKT.MHM. 756-31. 2 Ramadan 1269 - 9 June 1853.
25 Hezargrad in Ottoman Turkish.
26 BOA. Ahyolu in Ottoman Turkish.
27 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 237/98, 22 Ramadan 1272 – 27 May 1856.
   BOA. A.MKT.UM. 238/40. 27 Ramadan 1272 – 1 June 1856.
28 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 232-84. 9 Şevval 1272 – 13 June 1856.
29 Dıraç in Ottoman Turkish.
30 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 241-29 23 Şevval 1272 – 27 June 1856.
31 BOA. HR.MKT. 205/24, 13 Muharrem 1274 – 3 September 1857.
32 The present name is Shumen, a town in the region of Deliorman, the north-eastern part of Bulgaria.
33 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 258/12, 22 Safer 1273 – 22 February 1856.
34 BOA. HR. SYS. 250/1-221, 29 Ramadan 1291 – 9 November 1874.
35 BOA. HR.SYS. 250-1/96, 8 R.evvel 1292 – 14 April 1875.
36 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 242-85. 5 Z.kade 1272 – 8 July 1876.
37 Ziştovi in Ottoman Turkish.
38 Plevne in Ottoman Turkish.
39 Northern Lofça in Ottoman Turkish.
40 Selvi in Ottoman Turkish.
41 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 57/72, 27 C.evvel 1267 – 30 March 1851.
42 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 313/4, 11 Ramadan 1274 – 25 April 1858.
43 The village is located in the Blagoevgrad Province in Southern Bulgaria.
44 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 385/22, 1 C.ahir 1276 – 26 December 1859.
45 BOA. HR.MKT. 317/2, 9 C.Ahir 1276 – 3 January 1860.
46 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 317/4, 12 Z.kade 1274 – 24 June 1858.
47 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 322/94, 28 Muharrem 1275 – 7 September 1858.
48 BOA. A.MKT.UM. 487/24, 19 Muharrem 1278 – 27 July 1861.
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